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ABSTRACT
The  construction  of  large  dams  is  one  of  the  most  costly  and  controversial  forms of  public
infrastructure investment in developing countries, but little is known about their impact.  This paper
studies the productivity and distributional effects of large dams in India. To account for endogenous
placement of dams we use GIS data and the fact that river gradient affects a district's suitability for
dams to provide instrumental variable estimates of their impact. We find that, in a district where a
dam is built, agricultural production does not increase but poverty does. In contrast, districts located
downstream from the dam benefit from increased irrigation and see agricultural production increase
and poverty fall. Overall, our estimates suggest that large dam construction in India is a marginally
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\If you are to su®er, you should su®er in the interest of the country."
Indian Prime Minister Nehru, speaking to those displaced by Hirakud Dam, 1948.
Dams epitomize a central fact about many public investments and policies, ranging from
road construction to trade liberalization { economic gains often come at the cost of making
some groups worse o®. According to the World Commission on Dams (2000a) large dam
construction has displaced between 40-80 million people worldwide and submerged, salinated
or waterlogged vast tracts of land. In principle the aggregate gains from building dams could
be used to compensate those who lose land or livelihood. However, it is unclear whether this
occurs if, as is often the case, the winners, but not the losers, are politically and economically
advantaged.
Economic evaluations of dams and similar public investments largely ignore their distri-
butional e®ects. This is inappropriate if political support for a public investment can be
realized with little commitment to a subsequent redistribution of the gains. Ignoring dis-
tributional implications is also problematic from an econometric viewpoint. For instance,
if a public investment makes some regions worse o® while others bene¯t, then a regional
evaluation which does not account for the distribution of losers is likely to be biased.
Dams are a particularly good case for studying the potential disjunction between the
distributional and productivity implications of a public policy. The likely winners and losers
from dam construction are clearly identi¯able: those who live downstream from a dam (in
its \command" area) stand to bene¯t, while those in the vicinity of and upstream from a
dam (in its \catchment area") stand to lose. From an econometric viewpoint, this implies
that we can estimate the e®ect of dams separately for these two populations. From a policy
perspective, this makes it relatively easy to identify, and compensate, losers. The absence
or inadequacy of compensation in such a comparatively simple case would suggest that the
distributional consequences of public policies are perhaps less easy to remedy than is typically
assumed.
Worldwide, over 45,000 large dams have been built and nearly half the world's rivers
are obstructed by a large dam. Proponents of large dam construction emphasize the role of
large dams in enabling irrigation (both directly and by recharging the groundwater table),
providing water and hydropower for domestic or industrial use, and as insurance against
rainfall shocks. By the year 2000, dam reservoirs stored roughly 3,600 cubic kilometers
of water, generated 19 percent of the world's electricity supply and provided irrigation for
2between 30-40 percent of the 271 million hectares irrigated worldwide (World Commission on
Dams 2000a).
Opponents argue that most of the gains associated with dam construction occur down-
stream. The only gains enjoyed by the upstream population are from the construction
activity itself and from economic activity around the reservoir. The losses they su®er, in
contrast, are large; dam construction causes signi¯cant loss of agricultural and forest land,
and increased salinity and waterlogging of the land around the reservoir(McCully (2001) and
Singh (2002)). The upstream populations are also more exposed to diseases caused by the
large-scale impounding of water, such as malaria.
The oscillating policy stance of the World Bank, the single biggest source of funds for
large dam construction, illustrates the tension between aggregate productivity bene¯ts and
the social costs of large dams. Starting in the mid-1980s, the Bank responded to growing
criticism by NGOs and civil society of the costs imposed on those living in the vicinity
of dams by sharply reducing its funding for dam construction. However, it has recently
changed its policy and restarted lending for dams (with a loan for a large dam in Laos),
arguing that the rationale for the dam rests on proper use of revenues for poverty reduction
and environmental management.
What is striking in the policy debates, both at the Bank and in civil society, is the absence
of evidence on the impact of the average large dam, and on the success of governments in
compensating any losers. The aim of this paper is to provide such evidence. Our empirical
investigation focusses on India, which, with over 4,000 large dams, is the world's third most
proli¯c dam builder (after China and the USA). Large dam construction remains the main
form of public investment in irrigation in India, and dam irrigated areas account for 35% of
the area irrigated throughout the country.1
Several factors, including geographic suitability, the political clout of local governments,
and the economic implications of dam construction a®ect dam placement. Hence a simple
comparison of outcomes in regions with and without dams is unlikely to provide a causal
estimate of the impact of dams. Regions where relatively more dams are built are also likely
to di®er along other dimensions, such as potential agricultural productivity.
To address this problem we exploit the fact that a river °owing at a positive gradient
favors dam construction. A higher water level upstream enables water storage and diversion
into irrigation canals, and electricity generation. Too high a river gradient, however, makes it
1Between 1951-1997 public investment on major and medium irrigation projects in India was approxi-
mately 33 billion US dollars (Thakkar 2000)
3di±cult to build canals and to monitor the water °ow into them. In contrast, a steep positive
river gradient is good for hydro-electricity generation. This implies that the relationship
between river gradient in an area and its suitability for dam construction is non-linear for
irrigation dams and linear for hydro-electric dams.
Detailed GIS data on district geography allows us to exploit variation in dam construction
induced by di®erences in river gradient across districts within Indian states to construct
instrumental variable estimates.2 Our regressions control for district ¯xed e®ects, state
year interactions, and the interaction of most district geography variables with overall dam
construction in the state. Only the interaction between the fraction of district rivers in
di®erent gradient categories and overall dam construction in the state is assumed to be
exogenous. This makes our empirical strategy robust to a range of omitted variable and
(potential) endogeneity concerns. First, we fully control for di®erential state-speci¯c time
trends. Second, if districts with greater river presence or relatively more gradient evolved
di®erently from other districts in the same state in a way that is correlated with overall dam
incidence in the state, then this is controlled for by the interaction term between the number
of dams in the state and these variables. This estimation strategy is one of the contributions
of this paper, and can be used to provide convincing estimates of the economic e®ects of
large infrastructure projects, where project location is strongly in°uenced by geography.
Our outcome variables are district agricultural and poverty outcomes. Dams do not a®ect
agricultural production in the district where they are located. In contrast, irrigated area and
agricultural production increase in districts located downstream. A cost-bene¯t analysis
suggests that the increase in agricultural productivity does not justify the average dam;
even excluding the deadweight loss of taxation, environmental damages, and the increase in
labor usage, the rate of return to the investment is only about 1% on average.
Further, it does not seem that productivity gains in downstream districts are used to
compensate the losers. Poverty declines in the districts located downstream from a dam,
but increases signi¯cantly in districts where dams are built. In downstream districts dams
serve as insurance devices against rainfall shocks. However, they increase vulnerability to
rainfall shocks in the districts where they are built.
These ¯ndings suggest that large dam construction in India is a cost-ine®ective public
policy that has increased poverty in some areas. The results also underscore the need to
2District is the administrative unit below the Indian state, and district size is typically determined on
a population basis. The median Indian state has 23 districts, the maximum and minimum are 63 and 1
districts respectively.
4account for distributional e®ects when evaluating any public policy. Dam construction in
India created identi¯able losers who were not adequately compensated. While identifying all
the reasons for inadequate redistribution is beyond the scope of the paper, we do explore the
role of district institutions. We build on Banerjee and Iyer (2005) who examine the present-
day implications of the colonial land tenure system. They show that, relative to districts in
which individuals remained responsible for tax collection, districts in which landlords were
responsible for collecting taxes saw greater class con°ict. They show that the economic
e®ects of this institution have persisted { there is less collective action and public good
provision in the latter districts today. In keeping with this, we ¯nd that the increase in
poverty due to dams is twice as large in landlord districts, even though the impact of dams
on production is similar in landlord and non-landlord districts. These ¯ndings are consistent
with the view that adversarial relationships between the elite and the displaced populations
limit the ability of the displaced to obtain compensation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the case study literature
on the productivity and welfare e®ects of large dam construction in India, and uses a simple
production function framework to discuss the expected e®ects of dams. Section 3 describes
the data, Section 4 the empirical strategy, Section 5 the empirical results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Background
In this section we summarize the main insights about the economic impact of dams o®ered
by the case-study literature on Indian dams, and provide a simple conceptual framework to
understand the likely economic impact of dams.
2.1 Literature Review
The main purposes served by dams are irrigation, hydropower and °ood control. Irrigation
is the primary purpose of over 95% of large Indian dams, and dams built for this purpose
form the focus of our discussion.3
Most irrigation dams in India are embankment dams. That is, an arti¯cial wall is built
across a river valley, and water is impounded behind this wall in a `reservoir'. A system of
3The pre-requisites for construction and the economic consequences of hydro-electric and irrigation dams
di®er signi¯cantly.
5spillways and gates conveys normal stream and °ood °ows over, around, or through this wall,
and arti¯cial canals channel water from the reservoir to downstream regions for irrigation.
The area upstream from which water and silt °ow into the reservoir, and the area submerged
by the reservoir, form the catchment area. The area downstream from the reservoir that is
covered by the dam's canal network makes up the command area.
Dam construction may increase economic activity in the catchment area. Reservoirs
may provide a source of ¯shing, and are often developed as tourism sites. However, the
main economic bene¯t of dams has been realized in agriculture, and this bene¯t accrues
in the command area (here we draw upon the review in Thakkar (2000)). By 2000, dam
irrigation accounted for 38% of India's irrigated area. Between 1951 and 2000 India's food
grain production nearly quadrupled. Two-thirds of this increase was in irrigated areas. The
most optimistic calculations suggest that roughly a quarter of India's increased food grain
production over the last half century can be attributed to dam-irrigated areas. The main
channels through which dam irrigation increases productivity are greater multi-cropping and
the cultivation of more pro¯table water-intensive cash crops such as sugarcane (Singh 2002).
Clearly, the bene¯ts linked to irrigation should not be entirely attributed to dams, since
without them some areas would have been irrigated by other means. The fraction of increased
food production in dam irrigated areas that is attributable to dam irrigation rather than, say,
the concurrent uptake of mechanized agriculture also remains controversial, with estimates
varying from 10% (World Commission on Dams 2000b) to over 50% (Gopalakrishnan 2000).
In defense of large dams, authors such as Biswas and Tortajada (2001) and Dhawan
(1989) argue that other forms of water harvesting, such as ground water and small dykes,
are relatively cost ine®ective and incapable of meeting the demands of large and growing
populations in countries with highly seasonal rainfall. Another major bene¯t of dams, not
shared by other means of irrigation, is their ability to prevent °oods and droughts by reg-
ulating the °ow of water downstream. For very large dams, the °ood control e®ect may
extend thousands of miles downstream. There is, however, a trade-o® between using dams
for °ood control (which requires emptying the reservoir) and their use for irrigation or elec-
tricity (which requires ¯lling the reservoir). Another potential bene¯t of a large dam is
seepage from its canals which recharges the aquifers that provide groundwater (Dhawan
1993). However, the extent of such groundwater recharge remains controversial.
In fact, critics of large dams argue that the more important consequence of such water
seepage is waterlogging, and increased soil salinity; both of which make land less productive.4
4Land becomes toxic for plants when salt concentration is 0.5-1% (Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984)
6The Indian Water Resources Ministry estimated that, in 1991, about 2.46 million hectares
of the command area of dams su®ered from waterlogging, and 3.30 million hectares from
salinity/alkalinity (World Commission on Dams 2000b). This is roughly a tenth of the area
irrigated by dams. The other main costs of dam irrigation are land submergence for con-
struction of the reservoir and the displacement of people living on this land. The reservoir
of a large dam can submerge up to 10% of an Indian district's total area. The World Com-
mission on Dams (2000b) estimates that dam construction submerged 4.5 million hectares
of Indian forest land between 1980 and 2000. Using data for 140 large dams, they estimate
that the average dam displaces 31,340 persons and submerges 8,748 hectares. These ¯gures,
however, remain controversial. A World Bank review in the mid-1990s, for instance, esti-
mated that each new large dam dispaced, on average, 13,000 people (Cernea 1996)). Total
displacement ¯gures vary from 16 million to over 40 million people. It is also widely agreed
that the historically disadvantaged tribal populations who are more likely to live in uphill
areas in river valleys have borne the brunt of displacement. O±cial ¯gures for 34 large dams
show that Scheduled Tribes, who make up 8% of India's population, constituted 47% of
those displaced (World Commission on Dams 2000b).
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which empowers the government to acquire any land
for public purpose and to pay cash compensation, has formed the the basis for rehabilitation
of dam-displaced populations. Resettlement and compensation is, typically, the responsibil-
ity of the relevant project authorities, and is based on project-speci¯c government resolutions.
A number of studies suggest that actual compensation depends on the displaced population's
political power and organizational abilities (Thukral 1992). Rights of the landless and those
without formal land titles to compensation have typically not been recognized. Further, as
the compensation is typically insu±cient for the displaced to replace lost land by its equiv-
alent in quality and extent elsewhere, the payment is often used as a temporary means of
subsistence (J.Dreze, M.Samson, and S.Singh 1997). Finally, while an individual receives
compensation after being displaced, development activities and land prices in the dam vicin-
ity often decline as soon as a dam is planned, and the compensation rarely re°ects takes this
into account.
Another often-cited consequence of dam construction is adverse health consequences for
those living near the reservoir. A reservoir provides a natural ground for vector breeding,
and hence for diseases such as malaria, schistosomiasis, ¯lariasis and river blindness (see
Sharma (1991)).
The role of dams in increasing irrigation is largely undisputed. However, whether this
7increase in irrigation has, relative to a reasonable counterfactual, translated into substantial
productivity gains remains controversial. As the discussion in this section should make
clear, a distinctive feature of large dams is that the costs and bene¯ts associated with
dam construction vary by area. The bene¯ts from irrigation accrue mainly to those living
downstream to the dam site, but within its command area. In contrast, those living in the
vicinity of the reservoir and immediately upstream (the catchment area) obtain no irrigation
bene¯ts.5 Moreover, schemes that divert water upstream of the dam are often banned so
as to ensure su±cient water °ow to the dam (TehriReport 1997). This may further reduce
irrigation potential in the catchment area. Finally, the displacement costs are largely borne
by those in the catchment area of the dam. It has been suggested that compensation to
those displaced has been inadequate.
Our objective is to provide a rigorous analysis of these claims. While investigating all
the channels through which dams a®ect productivity and welfare is beyond the scope of this
paper, we will evaluate the impact of dams on aggregate agricultural production, poverty,
disease and a range of related outcomes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
We provide a simple framework which summarizes the economic implications of dam con-
struction. Assume that agricultural output is a function of labor inputs L, land surface
K, land quality A, inputs such as fertilizer, seeds and electricity I, climate r (rainfall and
temperature), farmer's ability u and a productivity shock ². Denote the production function
for land without access to an irrigation system (via pump or canal) as
y = F1(L;K;A;I;r;u;²)
and the production function for land with access to an irrigation system as
y = F2(L;K;A;I;r;u;²)
Farmers pay a one time ¯xed cost c for access to irrigation. This is the cost of a well or
tube-well in a region with no dams, and the cost of accessing canal irrigation in a dam's
command area.6
5Lift irrigation is rarely practiced in India.
6The annual recurrent cost for access to irrigation is very low and rarely enforced: it was Rs. 50 per
hectare in most states in 1980 (the recurrent cost of dam maintenance is closer to Rs. 300.
8Evenson and McKinsey (1999) estimate these production functions using Indian data,
and ¯nd that irrigation mitigates the e®ect of rainfall shocks and temperature on farm
net revenue for all crops. Further, irrigation and agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer,
electricity and seeds for High Yielding Variety (HYV) crops are complements. HYV seeds
are highly sensitive to water timing and require regular and controlled irrigation. Finally,
multi-cropping and irrigation are also complements, which suggests that labor inputs are
also likely to be complementary to irrigation.
We assume farmers can obtain the optimal set of inputs. Each farmer will compute her
expected pro¯t with and without irrigation. She will invest in irrigation if its cost is less
than the long-run di®erence between the value function with irrigation and that without
irrigation. The decision process follows a threshold rule: if the productivity shock exceeds
some threshold in a given period, the farmer switches in that period.
As the costs and bene¯ts of dam irrigation vary by region, we separately discuss the
e®ects of dams on the catchment and the command areas.
In the command area, which is downstream to the dam, a dam lowers the ¯xed cost of
irrigation. A farmer who has already paid the sunk cost of accessing ground water irrigation
will not switch to canal irrigation. However, the set of farmers who would have chosen ground
water irrigation in this period will now choose dam irrigation. Further, of the farmers who
would have otherwise not irrigated their land, some will opt for dam irrigation. Demand for
labor, fertilizer and seeds will increase and dependence on rainfall will decrease. Wages and
pro¯ts will increase, and this will increase consumption and lower poverty.
Until now, we have not allowed for di®erences in farmer characteristics. However, the net
impact of a dam on agricultural productivity is sensitive to di®erences in these. For instance,
if farmers only di®er in their cost of accessing ground water irrigation then, dams will have a
large positive e®ect on productivity by making irrigation accessible to productive farmers. If
instead, farmers face the same cost of irrigation but di®er in their (idiosyncratic) productivity
then the marginal farmer's productivity will be below that of the average farmer. In this case
the e®ect of dams on agricultural productivity will be muted. The distribution of farmer
characteristics will also a®ect the implications of dam construction for inequality.
The catchment area, which lies upstream from, and in the vicinity of, the dam, has
three types of land. First, there is the land that is submerged by reservoir construction.
Production on this land will stop, as will input and labor use. Second, there is land in the
immediate vicinity of the reservoir. This will see more waterlogging and salination, and a
worsening of land quality. Irrigation on such land is less pro¯table but fertilizer use may
9increase, since poorer soil requires more nutrients. Finally, some land in the catchment
area will be physically una®ected. If restrictions on water use upstream from the dam are
enforced then such land may see irrigation costs increase. On balance, in the catchment
area, we expect a decline in cultivated land, and, potentially, a reduction in irrigated area
and yield. This suggests a fall in wages and pro¯ts (and, therefore, higher poverty).
Data on the geographic extent of the catchment and command area is unavailable for
most Indian dams. Our analysis uses data on the administrative unit within the Indian state
{ the district. We know the district in which a dam is located, and the districts downstream
from it. A dam's catchment area usually falls in the district in which it is built, while its
command area may include parts of the district in which it is located and parts of neighboring
downstream districts (to identify the extent of the average dam's command area we will also
examine its impact on non-neighboring downstream districts in the same river basin). The
estimated e®ect in the district where the dam is built combines the e®ects in catchment,
command and una®ected areas, and is a priori ambiguous. In contrast, part of the dam's
command area may fall in the downstream district. Hence, the economic impact of a dam
in the downstream district will re°ect the e®ect of the dam on the command area.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Dam Construction across States
India is a federation of states, and water resources are under the jurisdiction of state govern-
ments. However, the federal government plays an important role in approving and ¯nancing
large dam projects. Before describing the growth in dam construction across states, we
outline the project planning, approval and implementation process for large dams (our de-
scription draws upon World Commission on Dams (2000b)).
Every ¯ve years the Indian Planning Commission sets each state a water storage and
irrigation target. To meet this target each state's Irrigation Department proposes dam
projects. After approval by the state government, these projects are submitted to the `Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Irrigation and Multipurpose Projects'. This committee uses
a cost-bene¯t ratio to decide whether a project is economically viable. Cost is de¯ned as
the direct project cost and bene¯t as the increase in agricultural production due to the ir-
rigation provided by the project, and/or the value of power to be generated. Typically, a
bene¯t cost ratio of 1.5:1 is desirable, but lower standards (1.1:1 or even less) are acceptable
10for projects in drought-prone areas (since dams are believed to provide valuable insurance
against rainshocks in such areas).
The Planning Commission accepts or rejects economically viable projects on the basis
of investment priorities and sectoral planning policies. Dam construction is funded out of
the state budget. Dam projects also qualify for federal funding. Funding from international
agencies, such as the World Bank, is usually allocated as part of federal funding. Actual
dam construction, and subsequent cost recovery, is the responsibility of the state.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Our sample spans 1970 to 1999 (the precise years
covered vary by outcome variable).7 In 1970, the mean number of dams in a district was
2.05, and the median district did not have a dam. Between 1970 and 1999 the number of
large dams quadrupled (from 882 to 3,364). By 1999 the mean number of dams per district
stood at 7.84, and the median district had one dam (46% of the districts had no dams).
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of dams across Indian districts in 1965 and 1995.
The increase in dam construction has been concentrated in the Western region (notably,
the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh).8 There has been relatively little
dam construction in North and North-Eastern India. Nine of the thirty two states or Union
Territories in our sample saw no dam construction until 1999, seven of which also saw no dam
construction in the bordering districts of neighboring states. As our identi¯cation strategy
compares districts within a state, our analysis de facto excludes these seven states.9
Maharashtra and Gujarat, two of India's fastest growing states, are also the largest and
third largest dam building states, respectively. An immediate implication is that regressing
an agricultural, or welfare, outcome on the number of dams in a state is unlikely to provide
a consistent estimate of the impact of dams. Clearly, richer states can build relatively
more dams. It is also probably in the interest of states that anticipate a larger increase
in agricultural productivity to make more of these investments. As fast growing states
show both greater reductions in poverty and more dam construction, regressing changes in
outcomes over the 1970-1990 period on changes in the number of dams built in the state
during the same period is unlikely to solve the problem of endogenous dam placement.
Table 2 provides an empirical illustration of this argument. We regress yist, the outcome
of interest for district i in year s in period t, on state and year ¯xed e®ects and the number
7The data appendix describes our various data sources.
8The median district in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh had 39, 18 and 15 dams, respectively.
9The nine states without dams are Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Delhi, Pondicherry. Punjab and Delhi have dams in neighboring upstream
states.
11of dams in state s in year t.10
yist = ¸1 + ¸2Dst + ºs + ¹t + !ist; (1)
As expected, the number of dams in a state is positively correlated with changes in
irrigated area and production, and negatively correlated with poverty.
In columns (4)-(6) we regress the same outcomes on the total number of dams in the
state inclusive of those built up to ¯ve years in the future. We continue to include state and
year ¯xed e®ects.
yist = ¸3 + ¸4Dst+5 + ºs + ¹t + !ist; (2)
The point estimates are remarkably similar across the two speci¯cations, even though the
latter speci¯cation includes dams built up to ¯ve years in the future. While dams may a®ect
poverty before construction is complete, this is unlikely for irrigated area and production. A
more plausible explanation is that states with high agricultural growth in the last ¯ve years
build more dams. This is also consistent with our ¯ndings in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2,
and suggests that a simple ¯xed e®ects strategy which compares changes in outcomes across
states will provide a biased estimate of the economic e®ect of dams.
3.2 Dam construction within states
For the reasons outlined above, we do not directly exploit inter-state di®erences in dam
construction to identify the economic impact of dams. Instead, we rely on di®erences in
dam construction across districts within a state. We account for, and explore the geographic
extent of, spill-overs from dams to neighboring districts. However, we cannot measure state-
wide economic e®ects of dam construction that are independent of a district's proximity to
the dam. These may include, for example, the e®ect on prices determined at the state level.
We will discuss the possible direction of such state-wide e®ects as we interpret our results.
Consider the following regression
yist = ¯1 + ¯2Dist + ºi + ¹st + !ist; (3)
10This regression parallels Merrouche (2004) who regresses state-level outcomes on number of dams in
the state. We cluster standard errors by state*year to take into account the level of aggregation of the
independent variable.
12where ºi is a district ¯xed e®ect, ¹st is a state-year interaction e®ect, and !ist a district-year
speci¯c error term.11 This speci¯cation di®ers from equation (2) as we use the number of
dams built in the district (rather than state), and include district and state-year ¯xed e®ects.
District ¯xed e®ects control for time-invariant characteristics that a®ect the likelihood that
a dam will be built in the district. State-year interactions account for annual shocks which
are common to all districts in a state. Hence, we only exploit annual variation in dam
construction across districts in a state for identi¯cation.
The fact that the district in which a dam is constructed includes some of the dam's
catchment and command area makes predictions about the economic impact of a dam in its
own district di±cult. In contrast, the economic impact of a dam in the district downstream
is predictable since the district is a®ected only by the dam's command area. Identifying how
a dam a®ects economic activity in the downstream district, therefore, both tells us how a
dam a®ects economic activity in its command area and helps us estimate the overall impact
of the dam. We are, therefore, interested in estimating the equation:
yist = ¯3 + ¯4Dist + ¯5D
U
ist + ºi + ¹st + !ist (4)
where DU
ist denotes the number of dams that are located upstream from district i.
If these equations are estimated using OLS, then the identi¯cation assumption needs
to be that the annual variation in dam construction across districts in the same state is
uncorrelated with other district-speci¯c shocks. However, even though dam allocation is at
the state level, we may expect this assumption to be violated. For instance, we may expect
relatively greater dam construction in or around agriculturally more productive districts
which have a higher demand for irrigation. Therefore, in addition to OLS estimates, we also
report instrumental variables estimates.
3.3 Dams and Geography
The viability and cost of dam construction at a location depends on its geographical features.
The most obvious requirement for dam construction is the presence of a river. In addition,
dam construction is cheaper and easier when the river °ows at a moderate incline. By raising
the water level upstream, a positive river gradient makes the diversion of water into canals
(for irrigation) easier and enables electricity generation. It also makes the construction of
the reservoir (where water is stored) easier. For irrigation dams a moderate river gradient
11We control for autocorrelation by clustering the equation at the district-level.
13is optimal. If the river gradient is too steep, then controlling the °ow of water into canals,
and indeed building canals becomes di±cult (in contrast, for electricity generating dams
more gradient is better). This implies a non-linear relationship between the ease and cost of
constructing irrigation dams and river gradient.
This non-linear relationship between river gradient and dam construction forms the basis
of our identi¯cation strategy. Controlling for overall gradient and river length in a district,
we use di®erences in river gradient to predict how, in a given year, dams constructed in a
state are distributed across districts in that state. Figures 1-4 illustrate our identi¯cation
strategy. Figures 1 and 2 depict the growth of dams across Indian districts between 1965
and 1995. North India, while home to one of the world's largest river basins, the Indo-
Gangetic basin, has seen almost no dam construction. In contrast, most dam construction
has been concentrated in Western India. This suggests that dam construction cannot be
predicted solely by river presence. Figures 3 and 4 point to the importance of river gradient
in determining dam placement. In Figure 3 we use GIS data to depict the average district
gradient, and observe that while central North India is very °at most of Western India is
at a moderate gradient. Figure 4 shows a similar pattern for the average gradient along the
river in districts, even though overall district and river gradient di®er for most districts.12
To predict the number of dams in a district we interact the number of dams in a state
with the geographic variables (after controlling for a full set of state-year interactions). Our
estimation strategy uses within state geographic variation to compare districts within states.
That is, we do not assume that district geography determines overall dam incidence in an
Indian state, but rather that it a®ects the allocation of dams within a state. We include a
full set of state-year interactions to control for di®erential trends across states that may be
correlated with dam construction.13
To illustrate how district geography variables predict the number of dams in a district
12Both were computed using GIS mapping software, which provides the gradient and elevation of multiple
\polygons" per district. We averaged across all polygons in a district to obtain average district gradient and
across polygons through which a river °ows to obtain river gradient.
13If the demand for irrigation in a single district drives dam construction in the state, then the number of
dams in the state is itself endogenous with respect to the outcome in that district. To address this concern
we estimate all regressions using, instead of the number of dams in the state, the number of dams in the
state predicted if all the dams built in India in that year had been allocated to states in keeping with their
share of all dams in 1970. Our ¯ndings are unchanged (available from the authors).












Dst is the cumulative number of dams in state s in year t. RGrki is the fraction of river
area in gradient category k, and Grki is the fraction district area in gradient category k.
We consider ¯ve gradient categories { less than 1.5%, 1.5-3%, 3-6%, 6-10% and over 10%.14
Elki is the fraction of district area in elevation category k. We consider four categories (in
meters) - 0-250; 250-500; 500-1000 and over 1000. Finally, Xi is a vector whose elements are
district area and river length.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report results for 1974 and 1994 respectively. Districts
with more kilometers of river have more dams. In addition, river gradient is a signi¯cant
determinant of dam construction. We ¯nd that a river gradient of 1.5-3% is more conducive
to dam construction than a gradient of less than 1.5%. For higher gradients we observe a non-
monotonic relationship. River gradient in the 3-6% interval reduces dam construction. River
gradient in the interval 6-10% does not signi¯cantly vary dam construction but having more
river °owing at a gradient of over 10% increases dam construction. The positive relationship
between very steep river gradient and dam construction re°ects the suitability of such areas
for hydro-electric and multi-purpose dams. Finally, we observe that the coe±cients on overall
district gradient and river gradient di®er. A possible reason is that district gradient may
directly a®ect agricultural outcomes in the district (which, in turn, a®ects the propensity
to build dams). For instance, district gradient may a®ect the ease of growing certain crops
(which may or may not be water-intensive).
Our estimation strategy exploits three sources of variations in dam construction: di®er-
ences across years, di®erences across states, and di®erences across districts within a state.
Table 4 shows the average change over our sample period in the number of dams constructed,
the head count ratio (de¯ned as the fraction rural population with consumption levels which
place them below the poverty line), and log agricultural production for four state-district
combinations. A district with less than 90% of river gradient below 1.5 percent is classi¯ed
as a `high' gradient district, and all other districts are classi¯ed as `low' gradient. States are
classi¯ed as high or low dam construction states: a state with more than a hundred dams
by 1999 is a `high' construction state, and `low' otherwise.
14We have experimented with other categories, and get similar results.
15Panel A compares dam construction between 1973 and 1999 in high and low gradient
districts in both types of states. Relative to low dam construction states, the increase in
dams is higher in both high and low gradient districts in high dam construction states. How-
ever, relative to low dam construction states, the di®erence between high and low gradient
districts is greater in high dam construction states. Under the assumption that, absent state
di®erences in overall dam construction, districts with the same gradient in di®erent states
would, on average, receive the same number of dams the di®erence in these di®erences can
be interpreted as the causal e®ect of a district's river gradient on dam construction. Between
1973 and 1999 a high river gradient district, in a high dam construction state, received seven
additional dams.
Panels B and C examine changes in rural head count ratio and log agricultural production.
In a high river gradient district located in a high dam construction state the head count ratio
increased by an additional 4.5 percent and log agricultural production fell by 0.32. The Wald
estimate of the poverty impact of dam construction is the ratio of the di®erence in di®erence
in Panels A and B, and stands at 0.64.
These tables illustrate our identi¯cation strategy, but our results are imprecise as we
only use part of the available information. In addition, here, we do not control for other
geographical variables which may be correlated with both river gradient and changes in, say,
the head count ratio. We, therefore, turn to a more general framework.
3.4 Instrumental Variables Strategy
² E®ect of dams in own district
We are interested in estimating equations (3) and (4), where we use information on
district geography to predict the annual allocation of dams built in a state across districts.
To implement this strategy we ¯rst predict (as in Table 4) the district-wise number of












The variables are de¯ned as before. Column (3) of Table 3 provides the coe±cient estimates.
The pattern of coe±cients is similar to the cross-sectional regressions in columns (1) and
(2). The F-statistic for the joint signi¯cance of the river gradient variables is 10.05.
16Columns (4) and (5) report the results from a regression of the same form, but with rural












The ®7k coe±cients in equation (7) parallel the ®2k coe±cients in equation (6) and provide a
reduced form estimate of the impact of dam construction on poverty. Annual dam incidence
in a state is potentially endogenous and may be directly related to poverty and production
outcomes in the state. However, we control for state-speci¯c trends by including state-year
interactions in the regression. Hence, we only compare districts within a state and use
the interaction of the number of dams in the state with the district-speci¯c river gradient
variables for identi¯cation. For the ®7k coe±cients to not re°ect the e®ect of dams on poverty
or production, we would require that, conditional on the interaction of overall dam incidence
with district area, elevation, gradient, and kilometers of river, the evolution of poverty or
production across districts in a state is correlated with the interaction between river gradient
and overall dam incidence.15
Figures 5 and 6 plot the coe±cients on river gradient from the head count ratio and
production regression, respectively. In both ¯gures, we also plot the coe±cients for river
gradient from the regression where dams built is the dependent variable (column (3), Table
3). The coe±cients for the head count ratio regression track those for dam building. In
contrast, there is no clear correspondence between the coe±cients from the production and
dam construction regressions. While the river variables are not jointly signi¯cant (columns
(4) and (5), Table 3), the positive impact of moderate river gradient on head count ratio
(t-statistic of 1.7) suggests that dam construction may have increased poverty in the dam's
district. In contrast, the coe±cients for the production regression are neither individually
nor jointly signi¯cant.
Equations (6) and (7) form the ¯rst stage and the reduced form equations of our instru-
mental variables strategy for estimating a modi¯ed version of equation 3, which includes the
geography variables (except for the river gradient variable) interacted with the number of
dams built in the state as a control variable. Speci¯cally, denote by Zist the vector of right
15One possible case is if only one district in a state are suitable for dam construction, so that the number
of dams in the state endogenous to growth in this district. Footnote 13 describes how we check that our
results are robust to this concern.
17hand side variables in equation (6), except for the interactions RGrki ¤ Dst. We estimate:
yist = ±1 + ±2Dist + Zist±3 + ºi + ¹st + !ist (8)
using the four variables RGrki ¤ Dst and Zist as instruments. For comparability, our OLS
regressions estimate equation (8) and therefore include these control variables.16
² E®ect of dams in own and downstream districts
To estimate the impact of dams located upstream from a district, we augment equation
(4) to include control variables:
yist = ±4 + ±5Dist + ±6D
U
ist + Zist±7 + Z
U
ist±8 + ºi + ¹st + !ist (9)
ZU
ist is a vector which includes the interaction of overall dams in the state with elevation,
district gradient, kilometers of river for upstream districts (set at zero if the district has no
upstream district), and a dummy for whether the district has any upstream districts.17
To generate instruments for Dist and DU
ist, we use parameters from equation (6) to predict
the number of dams per district d Dist. For the number of dams in upstream districts d DU
ist
this is the sum of predicted values from equation (6) for all upstream districts (it equals zero
if the district has no upstream district).18 We estimate equation (3) with 2SLS, using d Dist
and Zist as instruments, and equation (9) using d Dist, d DU
ist and ZU
ist as instruments.
The ¯rst stage equations are:
¢ist = Á1 + Á2 d Dist + Á3
d DU
ist + ZistÁ4 + Z
U
istÁ5 + ºi + ¹st + !ist (10)
where ¢ist represent Dist or DU
ist.
This procedure would be identical to a 2SLS procedure using the interaction of river
gradient variables with dam incidence in the state as instruments, if each district only had
one upstream district. Since this is not the case, our procedure is an e±cient way of using
all information: it uses all districts to predict the relationship between district geographic
features and the number of dams (rather than just those which are upstream), and avoids
averaging these features when there are several upstream districts.
16The OLS results are una®ected by the inclusion of control variables.
17For multiple upstream districts, we sum river length and district area across all upstream districts, and
average the other variables (which are proportions). We have run the regression controlling separately for
these variables for each upstream district, and found very similar results.
18Below, we will also explore dams that are upstream from a district, but more than one district removed.
184 Results
4.1 Agricultural Outcomes
We examine the impact of dam construction on gross and net measures of irrigated and
cultivated area. The net measures account for the relevant area at a single point in the
year, while the gross variables account for each separate use of the same area during a year.
Multi-cropping is measured as the ratio of gross to net cultivated area.
Panel A of Table 5 provides OLS estimates (equations (3) and (4)), and Panel B 2SLS
estimates. Both sets of estimates suggest no signi¯cant impact of dams on gross or net
irrigated area in the districts where they are built (columns (1)-(4)). The 2SLS estimate
for own district irrigated area is positive but insigni¯cant. The absence of a clear e®ect
in the district where the dam is built suggests that the submergence and degradation of
land around the reservoir has limited irrigation gains in the vicinity of the dam. The large
standard errors potentially re°ect variation in the extent of submergence associated with
di®erent sizes of dam.
Dams signi¯cantly increase gross and net irrigated area in districts located downstream.19
The 2SLS estimates exceed the OLS estimates, but both are signi¯cant and statistically
indistinguishable from each other. The point estimate suggests that an additional dam
increases irrigated area (gross or net) in the downstream district by roughly 1.1%.
In columns (5)-(8) we examine gross and net cultivated area. The 2SLS estimates of the
e®ect of a dam on both measures is negative and signi¯cant at the 10% level for downstream
districts, and in columns (6) and (8) for own district. This suggests the causal e®ect of a dam
is to reduce cultivable area, perhaps due to the submergence associated with construction of
reservoir and canals. In addition, some land may be lost due to waterlogging and salination.
Consistent with the idea that these e®ects are greater around the reservoir, we observe that
the own district e®ect is ¯ve times as large as the e®ect downstream. One explanation for
the insigni¯cant OLS estimates is that more dams were allocated to districts where land
availability was otherwise expanding (say, due to higher returns to agriculture).
Columns (9)-(10) examine the extent of multi-cropping and ¯nd a positive, but insigni¯-
cant, increase in multi-cropping in the downstream districts. Finally in columns (9)-(10) we
observe that, as expected, area under water-intensive High Yielding Varieties (HYV) crops
increases downstream.
19That is, districts with more dams in neighboring upstream districts have more irrigated area: see columns
(2) and (4), row 2 in both panels.
19Table 6 uses annual data for 1971-1987 to examine agricultural production and yield for
nineteen crops, and fertilizer use. Columns (1) and (2) consider total production. Both
the OLS and 2SLS estimates suggest that dam construction led to an insigni¯cant decline
in overall production in the district where they were built, and a signi¯cant increase in
production in the downstream districts. Similarly, agricultural yield showed an insigni¯cant
decline in the district where dams were constructed, but a signi¯cant rise downstream (see
columns (3) and (4)). The own district results, again, suggest that the land around dams is
degraded by dam construction. This degradation is, in part, compensated for by increased
productivity elsewhere in the district. The downstream districts that do not bear any of
the environmental costs associated with dam construction enjoy positive productivity gains.
Finally, fertilizer use increases in downstream districts, (see column (6)).
Dam irrigation increases area devoted to water-intensive HYV crops. In Table 8 we
examine crop-wise outcomes for six major crops, three of which are water-intensive.20
Columns (1)-(4) consider relatively less water-intensive crops, and columns (5)-(8) water-
intensive crops. We observe no impact on area devoted to di®erent crops in the dam's
own district. In downstream districts we observe a weak positive increase in total area
devoted to water-intensive and non water-intensive crops, and a very signi¯cant increase in
the area devoted to wheat, sugar and rice. Wheat and rice saw a sharp increase in water-
intensive HYVs over our sample period. Sugarcane is a water-intensive cash crop which is
very important in Western India (where most dam construction is concentrated).
The impact of dams on crop yield is modest, even for highly water intensive crops (Panel
B). The increase in area devoted to water intensive crops, combined with modest yield in-
creases, leads to a signi¯cant increase in the production of water intensive crops in the
downstream district. An additional dam increases production of water intensive crops down-
stream by 0.6%. This is mainly attributable to a large increase in sugar and rice production.
However, millet and wheat production also increases signi¯cantly in the downstream district.
These results are signi¯cant given that a major claim of dam critics is that dams cause
farmers to substitute towards water intensive crops which, while more pro¯table in the short
run, accentuate water shortages in the long run. While we ¯nd evidence that the area and
production of crops using more water, HYV crops and sugarcane, increase in downstream
districts, we do not observe any signi¯cant substitution away from major non water-intensive
20Our log speci¯cation implies missing values for a crop in a district if it is not produced in the district.
It is, therefore, not suited to examine whether dams a®ect the decision to produce a given crop. We
estimated separate speci¯cations to examine whether a certain crop is grown in a district, and did not ¯nd
any signi¯cant e®ect of dams.
20crops.
Moreover, the area and production of non-water intensive crops shows an insigni¯cant
decline in the district where the dam is placed whereas production of water-intensive crops
increases. This pattern of coe±cients is sensible given that irrigated area shows some increase
while overall cultivated area in these districts declines. However, these results must be
interpreted with caution, since none of the individual coe±cients are signi¯cant.
Our results provide a consistent picture of the impact of dams on agricultural outcomes.
In the districts where they are built dams do not signi¯cantly alter overall agricultural
production. In downstream districts, they enhance overall agricultural production, and
production of some water-intensive cash crops (sugar) and staples which have seen the advent
of HYV (wheat and rice).
4.2 Other inputs
The change in crop mix and the increase in HYV seed and fertilizer use in downstream areas
is consistent with the predictions of a simple agricultural production function.
The two other inputs that the agricultural production function suggests should be af-
fected by increased dam irrigation are the use of alternative forms of water infrastructure
(this should decline), and the use of electricity (this should increase because pumping water
through the canals associated with dams requires electricity).21
Panel A of Table 8 examines the impact of dams on the incidence of di®erent forms of vil-
lage infrastructure (for brevity we only report 2SLS estimate). The results are as expected;
in downstream districts electri¯cation increases and non dam-related water infrastructure de-
creases (the number of canals shows an insigni¯cant increase). There are no other signi¯cant
implications of dam construction for public good provision in own district or downstream,
suggesting no crowding in (or out) of other government inputs.
4.3 Cost Bene¯t Analysis of Dams
We use our above results to provide a cost-bene¯t analysis of dams. Our analysis is tentative
since it requires several clearly contestable assumptions and is based on somewhat noisy point
estimates. In order to obtain an upper bound on this cost bene¯t analysis we choose the
assumptions which are the most favorable to dams.
21Labor use should also be a®ected but we lack good data on labor use.
21We start with estimating the extent to which farmers substitute dam irrigation for other
forms of irrigation. Our estimates suggest that a dam increased net irrigated area by 0.7%
in its own district, and 1% downstream. Combined with the size of irrigated area in the
average district, these point estimates imply a dam-induced net increase in irrigated area of
6,300 hectares in 1985 (row B5 in table 9). Using the Indian agricultural census the Planning
Commission estimated that, in 1985, 23.6 millions hectares were irrigated by dams, or 8,758
hectares per dam (cited in Thakkar (2000)). These estimates suggest a modest crowding-out
of other investment in irrigation (of the order of 30%: see row B6 in Table 9).
The cost of dam construction is generally expressed in terms of the cost of irrigating
an additional hectare by dam. We therefore base the cost-bene¯t analysis on a comparison
of the value of additional production per additional hectare irrigated (from our estimates)
with the capital and recurrent cost of an additional hectare irrigated by a dam (Planning
Commission estimates, cited in Thakkar (2000)). Using 1985 means and our estimates, we
calculate the increase in production due to a dam in a district downstream to be Rs. 2.99
million annually, or Rs. 60 million in present discounted value (assuming a 5% discount
rate, and an in¯nite life span for the dam). This is due to an increase in irrigated area of
3,864 hectares. The present discounted value of the net increase in production per irrigated
hectare is Rs. 13,686. In addition, farmers face a lower irrigation cost (some farmers who
would have used ground water irrigation now use dam irrigation). Since a farmer always had
the option of not using irrigation, an upper bound on reduction in irrigation cost is the value
of increased production on the land. As discussed earlier, our estimates suggest that dams
substituted for other forms of irrigation in 30% of dam irrigated land. Therefore, we divide
our bene¯t estimate by 70% to obtain the net bene¯t of the dam on agricultural pro¯ts (Rs.
19,011 in row C7).
The Planning Commission estimated the development cost per hectare of dam irrigation
at Rs. 16,129 in 1985 (inclusive of capital cost, and an annual maintenance cost of Rs. 300
per hectare). Adding the fertilizer cost we obtain a total cost of Rs. 18,807 per hectare.
Without accounting for the deadweight loss of taxation, these estimates suggest a barely
positive net present value of dam construction (1%). This turns negative if we assume
a conventional 15% ¯gure for the deadweight loss associated with raising funds through
taxation. Our calculation overestimates the economic value of a dam in so far as it does
not account for the production decline in the dam's own district (while imprecise and not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, the point estimate is large and negative), and additional
labor and environmental costs. It underestimates the economic value of a dam in that it does
22not account for production gains in non-agricultural sectors due to electricity generation by
multipurpose dams.
Our estimates for the production impact of each dam, combined with the annual increase
in the number of dams over the period (about 0.4 per year), indicates that dam construction
was responsible for about 9% of the growth in agricultural production between 1971 and 1987.
The World Commission on Dams (2000b), using very di®erent methods, attributed 10% of
the growth in India's agricultural production since 1950 to dams, and concluded that the
average dam's net present value was slightly negative. Although this estimate was made by
a supposedly independent, non-partisan international body, dam proponents criticized these
estimates as overly conservative. The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD),
an international body for dam builders, claimed in its response that the contribution of
large dams to the growth in agricultural production was closer to 80% (Gopalakrishnan
2000). Our estimates suggest that World Commission on Dams (2000b) estimates are closer
to the truth.
4.4 Rural welfare
In this section we examine whether dams have created population groups who have not
received adequate compensation for losses su®ered, or whether the productivity e®ects of
dam construction, combined with appropriate redistributive policies, prevented the creation
of such groups.
We use a district panel data-set on rural consumption, poverty and wage outcomes.
Clearly, our results would be biased if dam construction induces either the relatively rich
or the relatively poor populations to migrate across district boundaries. Panel B of Table 8
estimates the impact of dam construction on district census rural population outcomes. Dam
construction has a small insigni¯cant positive e®ect on overall population and in-migrants
in both the dam's own district and downstream district. This suggests that dam-induced
population movements across the district boundaries are not a serious concern, and we can
use the district panel to study the impact of dam building on rural welfare.22 However, to
assess the extent of any possible bias due to migration we compute bounds on the in°uence
of migration on the estimated impact of dams on poverty. The results are in Table 10; Panel
A provides OLS estimates and Panel B 2SLS estimates.
In columns (1) and (2) we consider mean per-capita expenditure. In column (1), we
22Anecdotal and case study evidence suggests that displaced populations prefer to remain near their
original habitats. (Thukral 1992)
23¯nd that an additional dam causes a statsitically signi¯cant decrease of 0.3% in per-capita
expenditure in the OLS speci¯cation, and an insigni¯cant decline of 0.35% in the 2SLS spec-
i¯cation. Column (2) includes dams built in upstream districts as an additional explanatory
variable. The coe±cient on the expenditure in a dam's own district remains negative, and
is now signi¯cant at the 10% level in the 2SLS regression (and at the 5% level in the OLS
regression). Dams have a modest positive impact on per-capita expenditure in downstream
districts. However, both the OLS and 2SLS estimates are insigni¯cant. The 2SLS estimate
is almost twice as large as, but statistically indistinguishable from, the OLS estimate.
In columns (3) and (4) we observe that the decline in per-capita expenditure translates
into an increase in poverty. Columns (3) and (4) consider the head-count ratio (this is
the fraction of population with expenditure levels that place them below the poverty line).
Dams signi¯cantly increase poverty in their own district, and lead to a decline in poverty in
downstream districts. The downstream e®ect is signi¯cant at 5% in the 2SLS estimates. In
column (3), the OLS estimate for the own district e®ect is positive and signi¯cant, but the
2SLS estimate, while positive, is insigni¯cant: this parallels our reduced form estimate.
Columns (5) and (6) provide bounds that account for migration. We take the point
estimate of the e®ect of dams on in-migrants and make alternative assumptions about their
poverty status. We then recompute the head-count ratio (we follow the idea of \Manski
bounds" (Manski 1990)). In column (5), we compute the head-count ratio assuming that all
in-migrants are poor. This reduces the head-count ratio more in districts with more dams.
The OLS estimate of the own district e®ect changes sign and is insigni¯cant. However,
the con¯dence intervals in columns (5) and (4) overlap. The 2SLS estimate is positive
but insigni¯cant. In column (6), we recompute the head-count ratio assuming that all in-
migrants are rich. Not surprisingly, both the OLS and 2SLS estimates in column (6) exceed
the original estimates. As usual, as the Manski bounds are not tight, and the results have to
be interpreted with caution. However, they do not suggest severe bias with our 2SLS results.
The head-count ratio is a relatively crude measure of the extent of poverty. The poverty
gap measures the depth of poverty { speci¯cally, how much income would be needed to bring
the poor to a consumption level equal to the poverty line. Columns (7) and (8) consider
poverty gap as the dependent measure, and ¯nd similar e®ects: dams signi¯cantly increase
the poverty gap in their own district, and signi¯cantly reduce it downstream. The point
estimate for the poverty reduction associated with dam construction upstream varies from
one-fourth (in the OLS) to one-eighth (in the 2SLS) of the poverty increase in the dams' own
district. In our sample there are, on average, 1.75 districts downstream of each dam. This
24implies that the poverty reduction in districts downstream from the district where a dam is
constructed is too small to compensate for the poverty increase in the dam's own district.
In columns (9) and (10) we ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ect of dam construction on inequality in
either own or downstream districts. Columns (11) and (12) consider male agricultural wages.
Annual data are available for 1971-1994, but for fewer states than in the poverty sample.23
One might expect higher land productivity (especially from the production of cash crops)
to translate into higher agricultural wages. Wages increase in districts located downstream
from a dam. The 2SLS and OLS estimates are similar and suggest that 10 dams located
upstream cause an increase in agricultural wages of roughly 0.02% (the 2SLS estimates are
insigni¯cant). The point estimate for own district is positive but imprecise.
Finally, columns (13) and (14) examine the claim that dams increase the incidence of
malaria and other waterborne diseases in neighboring areas. We use data on annual malaria
incidence from 1976 to 1995, but ¯nd no evidence of increased malaria incidence. This
suggests that the poverty increase is more likely related to the loss of agricultural land and
displacement than to negative health e®ects.
Dams and Rainfall Shocks
A di®erent channel through which dams may a®ect rural welfare is by improving water
security in the event of °oods or droughts. If in years of bad rainfall dams provide insurance
within their own district, then they may increase welfare even if, on average, they reduce
consumption and increase poverty.
In Table 11 we use annual rainfall data for Indian districts to examine the role of dams
in mediating the e®ect of rain shocks. Our rain shock measure is the fractional deviation of
annual rainfall from the district's historical average.24
The odd columns in Table 11 document the e®ect of rain shocks on agricultural and wel-
fare outcomes. Negative rain shocks decrease area irrigated, total production, and increase
poverty. In the even columns of Table 11 we examine whether dams mitigate or accentuate
the e®ect of rain shocks (for brevity, we only report 2SLS estimates, but the OLS estimates
are very similar). Having a dam upstream reduces the adverse e®ect of a negative rain shock:
the coe±cients on dams-rain shock interaction variable and rainshock variable have the op-
posite sign. In contrast, dams amplify the e®ect of a bad rain shock in their own district;
the coe±cients on dams-rain shock interaction variable and the rainfall variable now have
23We get similar results when we restrict the year to years for which we have NSS data
24A higher value implies more rainfall, which, in general, is a good thing.
25the same sign. The ampli¯cation e®ect is potentially due to restrictions on water use in the
dam's catchment area.25
These ¯ndings have signi¯cant implications for the dynamics of poverty in these districts.
Low level of migration and closed markets imply an ampli¯cation of negative shocks (Jay-
achandran 2004). The poor in India have limited access to insurance against risk in rural
India (Morduch (1995)), and faced with limited insurance options the poor make ine±cient
investments (Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Morduch
(1995)), which may further increase poverty.
Institutions and Poverty
The inability or unwillingness of those who bene¯t from dams to compensate groups of
losers, or of the government to force them to do so, when both groups are clearly identi¯able
ex-ante suggests poor institutions of redistribution. To explore this possibility we build upon
recent work by Banerjee and Iyer (2005).
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) demonstrate signi¯cant di®erences in the ability of the popu-
lation to organize, and obtain public goods, across Indian districts. They argue that these
di®erences stem, in part, from di®erent historical legacies. During the colonial period, the
British instituted di®erent land revenue collection systems across districts. In some districts,
an intermediary (landlord) was given property rights for land and tax collection responsibil-
ities. In other districts, farmers were individually or collectively responsible for tax collec-
tion. "Landlord" districts saw the emergence of a class of landed gentry, who had con°ictual
relationships with the peasants. In these districts class relations remain tense, rendering
collective action more di±cult. Districts under the landlord system continue to have lower
public good provision, lower agricultural productivity, and more infant mortality.26
If the politically and economically disadvantaged are more able to demand redistribution
in non-landlord districts (and the elite feel more compelled to compensate losers), then the
poverty impact of dams should be smaller in those districts. Using Banerjee and Iyer's data,
we interact dams with either a dummy for being a non-landlord district, or the fraction
of land under non-landlord rule in a district and include this interaction as an additional
explanatory variable (our instrument set is as before, plus their interaction with the landlord
variable). The results are presented in Table 12, and are striking. There is no systematic
25In order to ensure su±cient °ow downstream, water use upstream from the dam is typically restricted,
especially in periods of drought.
26Banerjee and Iyer (2005) document that whether a district was a landlord district was related to British
politics, not district characteristics. Their results are robust to restricting the sample to neighboring districts
or using the date of conquest as an instrument.
26pattern in the production and irrigation regressions, suggesting that technology drives the
di®erential impact of dams on production and irrigation. However, the impact of dams on
poverty in own district is halved in non-landlord districts (the interaction coe±cient has a
t-statistic of 1.89 in the poverty gap regression), and we cannot reject the hypothesis that
dams do not increase poverty in non-landlord districts. There is no signi¯cant pattern in
the downstream districts where no losers are created.
We conjecture that in non-landlord districts the population is either more e®ective in
organizing to demand compensation, or more equal in sharing among losers and winners
within the district. It is also possible that the absence of the landed gentry gives the displaced
more political power. More generally, these ¯ndings point to the relevance of the institutional
framework within which public policies, such as dam construction, are executed and suggest
`weak institutions' or social con°ict may help explain why dam construction has particularly
strong distributional and poverty implications in developing countries.
4.5 Robustness Checks
We conclude this section with some alternative speci¯cations and robustness checks
Leads and lags
Columns (1), (4), (6) and (8) in Table 13 examine whether dams a®ect economic outcomes
prior to their construction. This speci¯cation check is particularly relevant for the poverty
regression since one could potentially attribute the poverty ¯ndings to a return to normal
poverty levels following a decline while the dam was being constructed. To examine this,
we include dams built up to 5 years in the future as an additional variable. Our faith in
our identi¯cation assumption is bolstered by the ¯nding that in no case does future dam
construction a®ect current outcomes.
Columns (2), (5), (7) and (9) examine whether the e®ect of dams persists 5 years after
dam construction. We ¯nd some evidence that the e®ect of dam is gradual; dams built 5
years ago, for example, a®ect poverty more than those built today.
Column (3) investigates whether dams recharge the groundwater table. If they do, then,
relative to the short run, irrigation potential in a district should increase by more in the
long run. We estimate a level speci¯cation for 1994, where we regress gross irrigated area in
1994 on the number of dams built in 1974 and the number of dams in 1994 (see column (1),
Table (3) for the corresponding ¯rst stage). We cannot reject the hypothesis that 1974 dams
do not a®ect 1994 irrigated area and are, therefore, unable to ¯nd evidence of groundwater
27recharging.
Functional form
Table 14 examines whether the e®ect of dams varies with dam size. Our instruments are
too weak for us to estimate multiple parameters. But since the 2SLS and OLS estimates are
similar for most speci¯cations, we feel con¯dent about focusing on OLS estimates.
Our regressions include as separate regressors the number of small (below 16 meters),
medium (16 to 30 meters) and large (above 30 meters) dams. The e®ect of dams on poverty
is driven by large dams, while the impact of dams on productivity is driven by medium
dams. This is in line with the case-study literature which suggests the negative impact of
dams is the most pronounced for very large dams. It is also possible that, for small dams,
the positive and negative e®ects on poverty occur within the same district (since both the
catchment area and command area are smaller) and averaging these e®ects over the district
implies no aggregate e®ect.
We also estimated, but do not report, a speci¯cation which includes as separate regressors
a dummy for whether there is at least one dam in a district, and the number of dams. The
dummy for "at least one dam" is insigni¯cant, and the coe±cient on the number of dams
remained unchanged (in magnitude or size) suggesting that the e®ect of the number of dams
on economic outcomes is linear in the number of dams.
Alternative neighborhood measures
Table 15 examines whether the impact of dam construction in a district extends beyond
its neighboring downstream districts. For brevity, we only report 2SLS estimates.
In Panel A we examine all neighboring districts. The e®ect of dams constructed down-
stream to a district is negative but insigni¯cant, and there is no e®ect in neighboring districts
which are neither upstream or downstream. In Panel B we examine whether a district ben-
e¯ts from dam construction in districts which are upstream to its upstream neighbors and
¯nd no e®ect. Clearly, some large dams may help control °oods several hundred kilometers
downstream. But for the average dam, it is unlikely that any e®ect extends beyond the next
two districts, and these results suggest that it does not extend beyond the next district.
This table suggests that our focus on the district in which the dam was built and the
adjacent downstream district is appropriate for capturing the e®ects of most dams, even if
some dams a®ect more than the immediate neighboring districts. It also suggests that our
estimate of the economic impact of dams in own and upstream districts on district outcomes
is a reasonable approximation of the overall e®ect of dams, save any general equilibrium
e®ect which a®ects all district equally.
28The most likely general equilibrium e®ect is a price e®ect, due to the increase in pro-
duction. If the poor are net sellers of agricultural products (Deaton (1989)), a decrease in
food prices is likely to accentuate poverty. In this sense, the failure to account for general
equilibrium e®ects is likely to underestimate the impact of dams on poverty.
5 Conclusion
In 2000, public spending on infrastructure in developing countries averaged 9% of government
spending, or 1.4 % of GDP (IMF Statistics). Despite the magnitude of such spending,
and a widespread belief that infrastructure is integral to development, evidence on how
investment in physical infrastructure a®ects productivity and individual well-being remains
limited (Bank 1994). There is also very little evidence on the distributional consequences of
such investment.
In this paper we have examined these questions in the context of large dam construction
in India. We have argued that any credible evaluation of large dams must address the
endogeneity of dam placement, which depends both on the wealth of di®erent regions and the
expected returns from dam construction. This problem of endogenous placement is central
to the evaluation of any large infrastructure project. Placement will re°ect both regional
need and a complicated decision-making process (Gramlich (1994)). While a growing cross-
country literature ¯nds that productive government spending enhances growth, most studies
are unable to convincingly control for unobserved heterogeneity (see, for instance, Canning,
Fay, and Perotti (1994) and Esfahani and Ramirez (2003)). By taking account of geographic
suitability for infrastructure we provide a potentially generalizable way of estimating returns
to investment. Our estimation strategy also allows us to examine the relative importance
of di®erent factors in driving infrastructure decisions. For instance, we ¯nd that our 2SLS
results are, with a few exceptions, very similar to OLS results when we restrict the comparison
to districts within a state, with a few exceptions. This suggests that while the overall number
of dams a state builds is endogenous, dam placement within a state has possibly been driven
by cost considerations rather than political economy or rate of returns concerns.
We have also emphasized the importance of identifying who the bene¯ciaries of invest-
ment projects are, and who bears the costs. To return to the example of the World Bank, in
Spring 2005 the Bank announced 270 million dollars in grants and guarantees for the Nam
Theun 2 dam in Laos. The New York Times (June 5, 2005) quotes a bank o±cial justifying
the return to dam lending as driven by the need to support infrastructure development in a
29`practical' way since \You're never ever going to do one of these in which every single person
is going to say, 'This is good for me"' (Fountain 2005). Implicit in this statement is the belief
that projects with an average positive return should be undertaken, as it will be possible to
compensate the losers. We, however, ¯nd a strikingly unequal sharing of costs and bene¯ts of
large dam construction in India. The results on poverty suggest that the government failed
to compensate people living near the dam for the inherent inequities in the gains and losses
associated with dam construction. Given that dams are at best marginally cost-e®ective the
absence of redistribution may well have been required to generate a political constituency
for large dams. We provide suggestive evidence that one reason for the lack of compensation
relates to the institutional framework within which policy decisions are made. In areas where
the institutional structure favors the politically and economically advantaged dams cause a
greater increase in poverty. We conclude that distributional implications of public policies
should be central to any evaluation, and that more attention should focus on understanding
the institutions, and power structures, that lead to the implementation of marginally cost
e®ective projects with signi¯cant negative distributional implications.
306 Data Appendix
Dams
Data on dams is from the World Registry of Large Dams, maintained by the International
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). The registry lists all large dams in India, completed
or under construction, together with the nearest city to the dam and date of completion.
We use city information to assign dams to districts in the year of completion.
Geography
Data on district area, river kilometers, district elevation and gradient and river gradient are
collated from two GIS ¯les: GTOPO30 (elevation data, available at
http://edcdaac.usgs.gov/gtopo30/gtopo30.html), and 'dnnet' (river drainage network data,
available at http://ortelius.maproom.psu.edu/dcw/). The ¯les were processed by CIESIN,
Earth Institute Columbia University using ARCGIS software. Polygon-wise GIS data exists
for every district. District gradient and elevation was computed as % district land area
in di®erent elevation/gradient categories (summed across polygons in district). For river
gradient we used the same process but restricted attention to polygons through which the
river °owed. We identi¯ed neighboring districts, and within them upstream and downstream
districts, from District Census Maps.
Agriculture data
These data are from the Evenson and McKinsey India Agriculture and Climate data-set
(available at http://chd.ucla.edu/dev-data ), with an update. The data-set covers 271 In-
dian districts within 13 Indian states, de¯ned by 1961 boundaries. Kerala and Assam are
the major excluded agricultural states. Also absent, but less important agriculturally, are
the minor states and Union Territories in Northeastern India, and the Northern states of
Himachal Pradesh and Jammu-Kashmir. Data on volume produced, fertilizer used and area
cropped are from the original data-set (1971-1987). We use the average 1960-65 crop prices
to obtain monetary production and yield values. Data on irrigated and total cultivated
area and male agricultural wages span 1971-1994. All monetary variables are de°ated by the
state-speci¯c Consumer Price Index for Agricultural laborers in Ozler and Ravallion. (1996),
base year 1973-74.
Rural Welfare data
We use household expenditure survey data collected by Indian National Sample Survey
(NSS). These are All India surveys with a sample size of about 75,000 rural and 45,000
urban households. Households are sampled randomly within districts.27 Only NSS for 1973
regional averages were obtained from Jain, K.Sundaram, and S.D.Tendulkar (1988). For
the 1983-84, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 (\thick") rounds, Topalova (2004) computed
district-wise statistics using the poverty lines proposed by Deaton (rather than those of the
Indian Planning Commission, which are based on defective price indices over time, across
27The NSS Organization does not report district averages, as it considers the district sample size inadequate
for reliable district poverty estimates. This does not a®ect us, since we report regression results for a larger
number of districts and do not make any inference about a particular district.
31states and between the urban and rural sector) (Deaton (2003a), Deaton (2003b)).28 The
1999-2000 round introduced a new 7-day recall period, along with the usual 30-day recall
period, for household expenditures on most goods. This methodology is believed to have
led to an overestimate of the expenditures based on the 30-day recall period, making the
poverty and inequality estimates non-comparable to estimates for earlier years. To achieve
comparability across surveys she follows Deaton and imputes, for 1999, the correct district
per capita expenditure distribution from households expenditures on a subset of goods for
which the new recall period questions were not introduced. The poverty, inequality, and
mean per capita expenditure measures were derived from this distribution.
District identi¯ers are available 1987 onwards (in hard copy for 1993). For 1973 and
1983, we have NSS region estimates (a region is a group of neighboring districts for which
the sample is su±ciently large for the NSS to deem the data \representative" of the region).
We use the district matching across censuses, and region to district matching, provided
in Murthi, P.V.Srinivasan, and S.V.Subramanian (2001) and in Indian censuses to match
regions to districts and account for district boundary changes.
Population, Public Goods and Landlord data
Population and Public Goods data are from the Decennial Census of India for the years
1971,1981 and 1991. The public goods data are referred to as village directory data, and
have been aggregated at the district level to generate the fraction of villages in the district
that have a particular public good (obtained from Banerjee and Somanathan (2005)). The
population data are in logs (obtained from the Maryland Indian District Database
(http://www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/vanneman/districts/index.html)). District colonial land
tenure system data is from Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
Rainfall
We use the rainfall data set, Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: Monthly and
Annual Time Series (1950-99), Version 1.02, was constructed by Cord J. Willows and Kanji
Maturate at the Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware. The rainfall measure
for a latitude-longitude node combines data from 20 nearby weather stations using an inter-
polation algorithm based on the spherical version of Shepards distance-weighting method.
We de¯ne a rainfall shock as the fractional deviation of the district's rainfall from the district
mean (computed over 1971-1999).
28Poverty lines were unavailable for the smaller states and union territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa,
Daman and Diu, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, An-
daman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Pondicherry, Lakshwadweep, Dadra Nagar and Haveli. Most are
already excluded because they have no dams or we lack other data for them. For those included, we use the
neighboring states' poverty line.
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34Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Beginning Period End Period Source
A. Geography
Fraction district with river gradient 0-1.5% 0.748 GIS
(0.31)
Fraction district with river gradient 1.5-3% 0.077 GIS
(0.08)
Fraction district with river gradient 3-6% 0.059 GIS
(0.08)
Fraction district with river gradient 6-10% 0.036 GIS
(0.06)
Fraction district with river gradient above 10% 0.077 GIS
(0.19)
B. Dams
Number of dams in district 2.39 8.66 ICOLD Dam Register
(4.55) (16.58)
Number of dams upstream to district 3.63 13.85 ICOLD Dam Register
(7.77) (30.57)
C. Welfare
Per capita expenditure (log Rupees) 3.80 5.79 National Sample Survey
(0.196) (0.271)
Headcount ratio 0.46 0.22 National Sample Survey
(0.156) (0.139)
Poverty gap  0.27 0.04 National Sample Survey
(0.052) (0.035)
Gini coefficient 0.28 0.26 National Sample Survey
(0.036) (0.038)
Agricultural wage (Rupees) 4.45 6.01 Evenson and McKinsey
(1.79) (2.19)
D. Agriculture
Gross cultivated area (in '000 hectares) 570 642 Evenson and McKinsey
(278) (324)
Gross irrigated area (in '000 hectares) 138 253 Evenson and McKinsey
(151) (222)
Total production (Rupees per '000 tons)  215841 297007 Evenson and McKinsey
(143896) (251412)
Fertilizer use (Rupees per '000 tons) 11606 40275 Evenson and McKinsey
(12177) (36040)
E. Demographics and Public Goods
Rural Population 1295120 1887262 Census of India
(867033) (1254164)
Rural In-migrants 365563 485667 Census of India
(239150) (308711)
Fraction Villages with any water source 0.982 0.997 Census of India
(0.026) (0.006)
Fraction Villages with power 0.244 0.806 Census of India
(0.255) (0.224)
Fraction Non-landlord districts 0.611 Banerjee and Iyer
(0.489)
Notes
1. Beginning and end periods are: (i) Dams: 1971 and 1999; (ii)Welfare measures:1973 and 1999, and for  wages: 1971 and 1987; (iii) Area 
variables:1971 and 1994; (iv)Production and fertilizer use: 1971 and 1987; (v) Demographic and Public goods:1971 and 1991.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dams in state 0.075 0.004 -0.0055
(0.012) (0.017) (0.0030)
Dams in state, year [t+5] 0.076 0.005 -0.0045
(0.012) (0.017) (0.0029)
N 6091 4571 1809 6091 4571 1805
Notes:
1. Regressions include state and year fixed effects.
2. Gross Irrigated Area and Agricultural Production are in logs.
3.Standard errors clustered by state*year in parentheses.Table 3: Changes in Number of Dams, Poverty and Production by State Dam Incidence and District River Gradient
District River Gradient
High Low  Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Dams constructed b/w 1973-1999 (per 100 dams)
High dam construction states 0.154 0.076 0.078
(0.019) (0.013) (0.023)
Low dam construction states 0.01 0.003 0.007
(0.200) (0.110) (0.003)
Difference 0.144 0.073 0.071
(0.017) (0.013) (0.023)
Panel B: Change in head count ratio b/w 1973-1999
High dam construction states -0.2315 -0.235 0.0035
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
Low dam construction states -0.231 -0.189 -0.042
(1.570) (0.019) (0.025)
Difference -0.0005 -0.046 0.0455
(0.019) (0.022) (0.030)
Panel C: Change in log production b/w 1970-1986
High dam construction states 0.124 0.311 -0.187
(0.046) (0.034) (0.010)
Low dam construction states 0.201 0.059 0.142
(0.012) (0.113) (0.022)
Difference -0.077 0.252 -0.329
(0.014) (0.017) (0.024)
Notes: 
1. A state with over 100 dams by 1999 is a high dam construction state, and a low dam construction state otherwise. A district with less than 90% of 
area along river with below 1.5% gradient is a high gradient district, and a low gradient district otherwise.
2. Each cell gives the average change in the variable for all districts with the specific district-state combination. Standard errors in parenthesis.Table 4: Geography and Dam Construction
Dependent variable Number of Dams Head count ratio
Agricultural 
Production
Cross-section FE FE FE
years 1979 1994 1973-99 1973-1999 1971-1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dams in state*(Fraction river gradient 0.082 0.114 0.152 0.077 -0.055
1.5-3%) (0.031) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045) (0.118)
Dams in state*(Fraction river gradient -0.119 -0.188 -0.233 -0.077 -0.053
3-5%) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.096) (0.182)
Dams in state*(Fraction river gradient 0.094 0.118 0.044 -0.058 0.183
6-10%) (0.079) (0.073) (0.077) (0.125) (0.332)
Dams in state*(Fraction river gradient 0.036 0.085 0.206 0.122 0.030
above 10%) (0.036) (0.038) (0.048) (0.111) (0.268)
F-test for river gradient 2.268 5.457 10.058 0.772 0.532
[p-value] [0.061] [0.000] [0.000] [0.543] [0.712]
Dams in state*River length  0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Dams in state*(Fraction district gradient  0.038 0.096 0.158 0.101 -0.158
1.5-3%) (0.037) (0.034) (0.049) (0.076) (0.183)
Dams in state*(Fraction district gradient 0.168 0.068 -0.009 -0.087 0.076
3-5%) (0.064) (0.061) (0.106) (0.134) (0.316)
Dams in state*(Fraction district gradient -0.627 -0.307 -0.096 -0.197 -0.150
6-10%) (0.108) (0.106) (0.239) (0.263) (0.603)
Dams in state*(Fraction district gradient 0.401 0.189 0.088 0.246 -0.014
above 10%) (0.098) (0.095) (0.174) (0.208) (0.511)
Dams in state*(Fraction district 0.019 0.015 0.008 -0.003 0.006
elevation  250-500 metres)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022)
Dams in state*(Fraction district  0.033 0.030 0.022 0.003 0.023
elevation  500-1000 metres) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.023)
Dams in state*(Fraction district  -0.351 -0.186 -0.082 -0.269 0.627
elevation over 1000 metres) (0.087) (0.086) (0.183) (0.304) (1.145)
Dams in state*District area 0.001 0.000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0005
(square kilometers) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005)
District Fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.77 0.75 0.97 0.97 0.94
N 371 371 1855 1855 4537
Notes:
1.All regressions include a full set of state*year interactions. Columns (3)-(5) regression include district fixed effects.
2.Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered by NSS region*year in column (3) and (4), and district in column (5).
3.Years included in the 1973-1999 sample are: 1973, 1983, 1987, 1993 and 1999. The 1971-87 sample has annual data.
4. River length is per 1000 kms and District area per 10,000sq. kms. Coefficients in columns (1)-(3) are multipled by 100. Table 5: Dams and Agricultural Area
Irrigated area Cultivated area HYV area
Gross Net Gross Net Multicropping Five crops
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PANEL A. OLS 
Dams:
Own district -0.092 -0.190 -0.132 -0.233 0.013 -0.023 0.026 -0.028 -0.027 -0.007 0.104 0.249
(0.413) (0.370) (0.387) (0.331) (0.066) (0.061) (0.049) (0.054) (0.060) (0.047) (0.371) (0.387)
Upstream 0.655 0.616 0.001 -0.058 0.070 0.601
(0.204) (0.208) (0.038) (0.036) (0.032) (0.274)
PANEL B. 2SLS
Dams:
Own district 1.349 2.251 1.343 2.145 -0.385 -0.508 -0.149 -0.441 -0.333 -0.145 0.262 -0.602
(1.104) (1.371) (1.046) (1.352) (0.225) (0.278) (0.205) (0.249) (0.212) (0.208) (1.216) (1.018)
Upstream 1.135 1.142 -0.010 -0.077 0.071 0.739
(0.288) (0.291) (0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.379)
N 6067 6067 6067 6067 6055 6055 6055 6055 6055 6055 4493 4493
Notes
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions and interaction of the number of dams in the state with district gradient, kilometers of river, and district 
elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls). 
2. Regressions in even columns include as additional controls the interactions of the number of dams in the state with: the average of proportion district gradient and proportion  district 
elevation, and the sum of river kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts).
3. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses.
4. Dependent variables are in logs. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Irrigated and cultivated area regressions are for 1971-1994, HYV regressions for 1971-1987. The crops in hyv area 
regression are wheat, rice, jowar, bajra and maize. Multicropping is the ratio of gross cropped area to net cropped area.Table 6: Dams and Agriculture
Production Yield Fertilizer Use
nineteen crops
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A. OLS 
Dams:
Own district -0.204 -0.253 -0.203 -0.242 0.385 0.572
(0.208) (0.223) (0.201) (0.208) (0.304) (0.309)
Upstream 0.218 0.169 0.316
(0.121) (0.107) (0.227)
PANEL B. 2SLS 
Dams:
Own district 0.061 -0.436 -0.442 -0.744 -1.707 -1.758
(0.749) (0.643) (0.597) (0.594) (1.440) (1.537)
Upstream 0.357 0.350 0.592
(0.165) (0.162) (0.272)
N 4537 4537 4537 4537 4521 4521
Notes
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions and the interaction of number of dams in the state with district 
gradient, kilometers of river, and district elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls). 
2. Regressions in even columns include as additional controls the interactions of number of dams in the state with: the average of proportion district 
gradient and proportion  district elevation, and the sum of river kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any 
upstream districts).
3. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses.
4. Dependent variables in logs. All coefficients multiplied by 100. Regressions cover 1971-1987. The 19 crops are wheat, rice, jowar, sugarcane, 
groundnut, bajra, maize, gram, tur, other pulses, barley, tobacco, ragi, sesamum, cotton, potato, jute, soy, and sunflower. Table 7: Dams and Crop Outcomes 
Non-water intensive crops Water intensive crops
All Millet Pulse Wheat All Sugar Cotton Rice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PANEL A. AREA CULTIVATED 
A1. OLS
Dams
Own district -0.52 0.16 -0.16 -0.27 0.14 0.72 1.99 -0.39
(0.36) (0.38) (0.44) (0.36) (0.23) (0.53) (0.86) (0.35)
Upstream 0.29 0.38 0.11 0.26 0.05 0.64 -0.02 0.33
(0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.18) (0.14) (0.37) (0.42) (0.21)
A2. 2SLS
Own district -0.03 0.58 -0.42 -1.32 1.25 3.57 0.71 0.76
(0.98) (1.30) (1.16) (1.00) (1.08) (2.57) (3.16) (0.94)
Upstream 0.14 0.37 0.06 0.42 0.33 1.38 0.05 0.77
(0.18) (0.24) (0.29) (0.20) (0.23) (0.40) (0.47) (0.31)
N 4530 4480 4464 4104 4489 4264 2790 4373
PANEL B. YIELD 
B1. OLS
Own district -0.044 0.105 -0.136 0.229 -0.135 0.133 -0.399 -0.172
(0.259) (0.479) (0.268) (0.220) (0.322) (0.268) (0.518) (0.358)
Upstream 0.114 0.268 -0.085 0.140 0.246 0.066 -0.382 -0.196
(0.134) (0.182) (0.086) (0.103) (0.207) (0.105) (0.254) (0.138)
B2. 2SLS
Own district -0.816 -0.829 0.104 -0.327 -0.593 0.424 0.447 -1.024
(0.655) (0.955) (0.586) (0.921) (0.950) (0.895) (1.351) (0.868)
Upstream 0.266 0.531 -0.077 0.293 0.315 0.156 -0.373 -0.229
(0.201) (0.280) (0.114) (0.160) (0.267) (0.142) (0.358) (0.173)
N 4528 4476 4456 4073 4482 4252 2582 4359
PANEL C. PRODUCTION 
C1. OLS
Own district -0.600 0.271 -0.341 -0.024 -0.015 0.722 1.343 -0.624
(0.427) (0.554) (0.416) (0.424) (0.400) (0.634) (1.112) (0.419)
Upstream 0.322 0.645 0.003 0.442 0.274 0.552 -0.242 0.154
(0.198) (0.235) (0.208) (0.220) (0.198) (0.395) (0.517) (0.215)
C2. 2SLS
Own district -0.818 -0.240 -0.407 -1.534 0.624 4.268 0.492 -0.225
(1.180) (1.670) (1.199) (1.358) (1.321) (2.963) (3.133) (1.213)
Upstream 0.295 0.896 -0.014 0.753 0.619 1.386 -0.053 0.544
(0.241) (0.349) (0.296) (0.284) (0.229) (0.415) (0.653) (0.330)
N 4531 4483 4456 4085 4497 4362 2587 4361
Notes:
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions, and interaction of the number of dams in the state with district gradient, kilometers of river, 
and district elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls). 
2. They also include as controls the interactions of number of dams in the state with: the average of proportion district gradient and proportion  district elevation, and the sum 
of river kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts).
3. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses.




facility Water facility Canals Power Tarmac road
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: PUBLIC GOODS
Dams
Own district 0.109 0.421 0.029 0.035 0.358 0.063
(0.210) (0.337) (0.059) (0.168) (0.413) (0.254)
Upstream 0.015 0.041 -0.024 0.040 0.199 0.063
(0.058) (0.096) (0.013) (0.091) (0.094) (0.084)
N 847 847 847 562 848 848






Own district 0.481 0.481 -2.145 1.364 0.330
(1.070) (1.555) (8.489) (1.961) (1.920)
Upstream 0.065 0.191 0.196 0.037 0.007
(0.104) (0.145) (0.937) (0.182) (0.161)
N 947 947 853 944 945
Notes:
1. Regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions, and interaction of the number of dams in the state with district gradient, 
kilometers of river, and district elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls). 
2. Other controls are the interactions of number of dams in the state with: the average of proportion district gradient and elevation, and the sum of river 
kilometers in upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts).
3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These are clustered by district. All coefficients are multiplied by 100.
4. The  regressions include 1971, 1981 and 1991. In panel A the dependent variable is the fraction villages in district with the public good facility. Water 
facility exclude dams. In panel B dependent variables are in logs and refer to the rural population. Table 9: Cost Benefit Analysis for Dams
A. Parameters
A1. Effect of dams on production downstream 0.00357
A2. Effect of dams on irrigation  downstream 0.0113
A3. Effect of dams on area in own district 0.022
A4. Effect of dams on fertilizer downstream 0.0059
A5. Number of dams built per year (1970-1997) (ICOLD) 0.46
A6. Number of districts downstream from a dam  1.75
A7. Deadweight loss of taxation (assumption) 0.15
A8. Capital cost of dam construction,  per hectare (Planning Commission) 12258
A9. Annual recurrent cost of dam upkeep (per hectare) (Planning Commission) 194
A10. Annual increase in production 0.0189
B. Calculating Substitution
B1. Area irrigated by dams, 1985 (hectares) (Planning Commission) 23570000
B2.  Number of dams in 1985 (ICOLD) 2691
B3. Area irrigated by per dam, 1985 (hectares) (B2/B1)) 8759
B4. Area irrigated per district in 1996 (hectares) (Evenson and McKinsey) 150940
B5. Additional area of irrigation due to dams (hectares) (B4*A2*A6+A3*B4) 6306
B6. Fraction newly irrigated/total irrigated 0.72
C. Cost Benefit analysis, 1985
C1. Total production in 1985(Rs per 1000 tons) (Evenson & Mc Kinsey) 83700000
C2. Total production increase per dam (downstream) C1*A1 298809
C3. Life time benefit (with 5% discount rate: C2*20) 5976180
C4. Area irrigated (in '000 hectares) 38641
C5. Increase in irrigation in downstream district per dam (C5*A2) 437
C6. Life time benefit per hectare irrigated (C3/C5) 13687
C7. Life time benefit, including cheaper irrigation (C6/B5) 19012
C8. Annual fertilizer cost , 1985 (Evenson and Mc Kinsey) 9912700
C9. Increase in fertlizer cost due to dams 58484.93
C10. Life time fertilizer cost per hectare 2679
C11. Life time capital cost+maintenance per hectare 16129
C12. Total life time cost 18808
C13. Total life time cost, with dead weight loss 21629
C14. Rate of returns, without deadweight loss 1.011
C15. Rate of returns, with deadweight loss 0.879
C16. Rate of returns, without deadweight loss, excluding fertlizer use 1.179
C17. Rate of returns, with deadweight loss, excluding fertlizer use 1.025
D. Contribution of dams to overall increase in production
D1=Annual increase in production 1581930
D2=Annual increase in production due to dams 137452
D3=Contribution of dams to annual growth in production 0.087
Notes
1. All values are expressed in 1973 prices. 
2. Unless otherwise specified the parameters are authors' calculations.Table 10: Dams and Rural Welfare
Percapita 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
PANEL A. OLS 
Dams
Own district -0.266 -0.316 0.267 0.277 -0.158 0.616 0.083 0.081 0.006 -0.001 0.067 0.178 -4.79 -1.32
(0.135) (0.127) (0.090) (0.089) (0.105) (0.096) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.217) (0.218) (6.17) (6.63)
Upstream 0.038 -0.051 -0.044 -0.059 -0.021 -0.005 0.207 -6.74
(0.053) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.012) (0.013) (0.098) (4.54)
PANEL B. 2SLS 
Dams
Own district -0.353 -0.756 0.493 0.772 0.387 1.188 0.144 0.228 -0.018 -0.014 -0.078 0.749 -15.20 -6.24
(0.590) (0.443) (0.328) (0.285) (0.326) (0.316) (0.093) (0.083) (0.125) (0.105) (0.818) (0.848) (24.81) (19.70)
Upstream 0.066 -0.098 -0.100 -0.107 -0.034 -0.008 0.222 -7.19
(0.071) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.016) (0.019) (0.151) (6.01)
N 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1794 1794 6072 6072 7126 7126
Notes:
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions, and interaction of the number of dams in the state with district gradient, kilometers of river, and district elevation (see table 4 
for a full list of controls). 
2. The regressions in the even columns (and column 5) also control for the interactions of the number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the proportion of district 
elevation, and the sum of river kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts)
3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These are clustered by 1973 NSS region*year in columns (1)-(10), and by district in columns (11) -(14). 
4. The regressions in columns (1)-(10) include 1973, 1983, 1987, 1993 and 1999. Column (11)-(12) regression covers 1971-1994.  Column 913)-1(14) cover 1975-1995.
5. Per capita expenditure and agricultural wages are in logarithms. Columns (3) and (4) use head count ratio figures as computed from NSS data. Column (5) and (6) adjust this using Table 7 migration 
estimates. Column (5) assumes all migrants are poor, and column (6) all migrants are rich. Malaria incidence is measured as annual Parasite Incidence ( API) = ( No. of blood smears found positive for malaria/ 
total population under surveillance)*1000. All coefficients are multiplied by 100.Table 11 : Dams and Rainfall Shocks
Gross irrigated area Total production Headcount ratio Poverty Gap
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Rainshock 0.084 0.073 0.090 0.122 0.077 0.131 -0.060 -0.045 -0.051 -0.018 -0.009 -0.006
(0.040) (0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.040) (0.046) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Dams -0.156 2.367 -0.138 -0.190 0.232 0.697 0.059 0.185
(0.368) (1.406) (0.223) (0.593) (0.093) (0.279) (0.030) (0.081)
Dams*Rainshock 0.752 0.591 1.211 0.472 -0.244 -0.238 -0.131 -0.196
(0.260) (0.267) (0.343) (0.288) (0.113) (0.175) (0.045) (0.086)
Upstream Dams  0.650 1.092 0.168 0.315 -0.043 -0.074 -0.020 -0.025
(0.204) (0.296) (0.111) (0.168) (0.038) (0.052) (0.012) (0.016)
Upstream Dams* -0.180 -0.143 -0.333 -0.298 0.063 0.117 0.015 0.037
Rainshock (0.077) (0.073) (0.103) (0.103) (0.039) (0.062) (0.013) (0.023)
N 6067 6067 6067 4537 4537 4537 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799
Notes:
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions, and the interaction of the number of dams in the state with district gradient, kilometers of river, and district elevation (see table 
4 for a full list of controls). 
2. All regressions with dams as a regressor also control for the interactions of number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the proportion of district elevation, and the sum 
of river kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream district)
3. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  These are clustered by district in columns (1)-(6), and by NSS region*year in columns (7)-(12).
4. Rainshock is the fractional deviation of district rainfall from district historic mean (over 1971-1999). Agricultural variables are in logarithms. All coefficients multipled by 100.Table 12 : Dams and Historic Land Tenure System: 2SLS estimates












Proportion   
non-landlord
  Non-landlord 
dummy
Proportion     
non-landlord
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dams 0.768 1.435 0.302 0.384 1.276 1.317 0.408 0.418
(2.077) (2.371) (1.198) (1.279) (0.588) (0.665) (0.197) (0.220)
Dams*Non-landlord -0.059 -0.688 -0.522 -0.592 -0.527 -0.601 -0.208 -0.225
(1.563) (1.728) (0.605) (0.644) (0.363) (0.399) (0.110) (0.125)
Upstream Dams  0.859 1.052 -0.041 -0.172 -0.292 -0.439 -0.133 -0.167
(0.851) (0.912) (0.667) (0.684) (0.334) (0.348) (0.099) (0.108)
Upstream Dams* -0.362 -0.593 0.445 0.576 0.077 0.214 0.056 0.086
Non-landlord (0.805) (0.809) (0.654) (0.665) (0.308) (0.313) (0.089) (0.096)
N 3427 3427 2550 2550 914 914 914 914
Notes:
1. All regressions include district fixed effects and a full set of state*year interactions, as well as interaction of the number of dams in the state with the district gradient, kilometers of 
river, and district elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls)
2. All regressions also control for the interactions of the number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the proportion of district elevation, and the 
sum of river kilometers in the upstream districts  (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts)
3. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  These are clustered by district in columns (1)-(4), and by NSS region*year in columns (5)-(8).
4.The sample is restricted to districts under British direct rule. Our landlord measures are from Banerjee and Iyer (2005) . All coefficients multipled by 100.Table 13:  Lead and Lag Effects of Dams: 2SLS Estimates
Gross Irrigated Area Total Production Head count ratio Poverty Gap
FE FE Level in 1994 FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dams
Own district 17.001 10.277 -13.44 2.598 0.467 1.181 0.236 0.309 0.071
(12.041) (5.019) (42.220) (2.063) (1.564) (0.472) (0.457) (0.132) (0.147)
Own district, t+5 years -17.770 -2.707 -0.87 -0.203
(15.580) (1.740) (0.674) (0.196)
Own district, t-5 years -8.918 -1.340 0.528 0.158
(5.318) (2.570) (0.381) (0.130)
Own district in 1974 49.45
(105.220)
Upstream 0.068 2.279 -1.968 0.312 0.164 -0.084 -0.061 -0.015 -0.036
(2.726) (1.467) (12.38) (0.557) (0.391) (0.131) (0.104) (0.041) (0.033)
Upstream, t+5 years 1.813 0.153 0.000 -0.039
(4.157) (0.738) (0.295) (0.087)
Upstream, t-5 years -0.887 0.242 -0.034 0.002
(1.213) (0.454) (0.088) (0.028)
Upstream district in 1974 0.754
(34.220)
F-test for own district and  2.57 0.230 4.89 4.95
own district t-5 years (0.078) (0.790) (0.008) (0.008)
F-test for upstream and  7.73 2.180 2.04 2.31
upstream t-5 years (0.000) (0.110) (0.131) (0.101)
District fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6067 6091 253 4554 4554 1799 1799 1799 1799
Notes:
1. For headcount ratio t-5 and t+5 refer to the previous and next year for which poverty data is available (on average 5 years).
2. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions and interaction of number of dams in the state with district gradient, kilometers of river, and district elevation (see table 4 
for a full list of controls).
3. All regressions also control for the interactions of the number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the proportion of district elevation, and the sum of river 
kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts).
4.All regressions except in column (3) include district fixed effect. 
5. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These are clustered by NSS region*year in columns (6)-(9) and by district in columns (1)-(2).
6. All agricultural outcomes are in logs. All coefficients multiplied by 100.Table 14: Effect of Dam Size: OLS estimates
Gross irrigated area Production Headcount ratio Poverty Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of small dams -0.931 -1.293 -0.292 -0.326 0.217 0.115 0.076 0.039
(less than 16 m) (0.583) (0.478) (0.267) (0.277) (0.133) (0.139) (0.047) (0.049)
Number of medium dams 1.305 1.500 -0.122 -0.057 0.192 0.371 0.036 0.074
(16-30 m) (0.754) (0.762) (0.452) (0.558) (0.242) (0.228) (0.075) (0.076)
Number of large dams  -0.863 0.067 0.174 0.353 1.575 1.584 0.600 0.589
(over 30m) (2.586) (2.689) (1.130) (1.304) (0.811) (0.824) (0.285) (0.286)
Number of small dams 0.885 -0.270 -0.055 0.014
upstream (0.309) (0.218) (0.109) (0.040)
Number of medium dams 0.663 0.796 -0.049 -0.045
upstream (0.384) (0.279) (0.125) (0.043)
Number of high dams  -3.359 0.069 0.136 -0.069
upstream (2.150) (1.342) (0.606) (0.212)
N 6067 6067 4537 4537 1799 1799 1799 1799
Notes:
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions and interaction of number of dams in the state with the district gradient, kilometers of river, and district 
elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls). 
2. All regressions in even columns also control for interactions of number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the proportion of district elevation, 
and the sum of river kilometers in the upstream districts (plus a indicator for whether the district has any upstream districts)
3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These are clustered by district in columns (1)-(4), and by NSS region*year in columns (5)-(8). 
4. 16 m is the 50th percentile of dam height in our sample, and 30 m the 90th percentile.
5. Gross irrigated area and production are in logarithms. Table 15: Dams and Neighborhood Effects: 2SLS estimates
Gross irrigated area Production Head count ratio Poverty Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A.  NEIGHBORING DISTRICTS
Dams
Own district 3.038 0.151 0.698 0.192
(1.442) (0.701) (0.325) (0.099)
Upstream 0.981 0.331 -0.102 -0.035
(0.280) (0.167) (0.050) (0.017)
Downstream -0.408 -0.020 0.074 0.025
(0.445) (0.242) (0.087) (0.026)
Neighboring but not -0.066 -0.054 -0.047 -0.019
upstream/downstream (0.418) (0.160) (0.081) (0.027)
PANEL B. NEIGHBORS OF NEIGHBORING DISTRICTS 
Dams
Own district 3.923 -0.312 0.847 0.245
(1.845) (0.629) (0.270) (0.084)
Upstream 1.716 0.543 -0.060 -0.013
(0.554) (0.276) (0.103) (0.033)
Upstream to upstream -0.219 -0.088 -0.016 -0.011
districts (0.297) (0.120) (0.060) (0.020)
N 6067 4537 1799 1799
Notes:
1. All regressions include district fixed effects, a full set of state*year interactions and interaction of the number of dams in the state with district 
gradient, kilometers of river, and district elevation (see table 4 for a full list of controls). 
2. Panel A regressions control for interactions of the number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the 
proportion of district elevation, and the sum of river kilometers in the upstream, dowstream, and other neighboring districts (plus indicator 
variables for whether the district has any upstream, downstream or other neighboring districts). 
3. Panel B regressions control for interactions of the number of dams in the state with: the average of the proportion of district gradient, the 
proportion of district elevation, and the sum of river kilometers in the upstream and upstream to upstream districts (plus indicator variables for 
whether the district has any upstream and upstream to upstream district). 
3. Standard errors clustered at the district level (columns 1 and 2) or the region*year level (column 3 and 4)

























































































headcount ratio damsFigure 6: Coefficients of River Slope in Production and Dam regressions
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